Code Spaces (SaaS)
Shut down after cloud console takeover
The Catastrophe
In June 2014, an attacker gained access to the AWS console and deleted production systems and backups; the company announced it was out of business within days. Network ComputingThe Hacker NewseSecurity Planet
Fallout
Total loss of customer data and services; no independent, immutable backups to restore from; operations ceased. Network Computing
Security Layer Failures Analysis
- ❌ Layer 1: People — Admins not drilled on cloud-credential hygiene & alerting.
- ❌ Layer 2: Physical — (Cloud) No separate break-glass path; single control plane exposure.
- ❌ Layer 3: Cyber — Missing/weak MFA & least-privilege on root/console; no guardrails.
- ❌ Layer 4: Risk Management — Control-plane compromise not modeled as a top risk.
- ❌ Layer 5: Leadership — No governance over backup isolation or key management.
- ❌ Layer 6: Culture — Assumed “cloud equals safe”; no operational discipline on restores.
- ❌ Layer 7: Resilience — No off-platform, immutable, routinely tested backups.
ROI of Prevention
Enforce MFA and role separation on cloud control planes; keep offline/immutable backups with regular restore tests; add CISO+ governance to treat console security as existential. Network Computing